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Abstract  
We run between-subject dictator games with exogenously specified ‘give’ or ‘take’ frames 
involving a balanced pool of male and female dictators and constant payoff possibilities. 
We find the following: Females allocate more under the taking frame than under the giving 
frame. Males allocate more under the giving frame than under the taking frame. In the 
taking frame females are more generous than males. But in the giving frame both are 
equally generous. Finally, when the combined population of males and females is 
considered, giving is found to be equivalent to ‘not taking’, because the opposing gender 
effects offset each other.  
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1. Introduction 
The ‘Dictator game’ has been one of the most popular experimental workhorses to 
understand and estimate altruism. In the standard form (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe 
et al., 1994) of the game, a subject (called the dictator) is given a certain amount of money 
and is asked to decide upon how much of that money to allocate between himself/herself 
and a passive subject (called the recipient). Since the dictator does not otherwise have any 
incentive to share the money with the recipient, the amount allocated is often used as a 
measure of altruism. Indeed, several experiments consistently find that dictators, on 
average, allocate a non-trivial sum of money (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011).  
There are variations of frames in the dictator game. A ‘taking’ frame (in short, TG) 
different to the ‘giving’ frame (as explained above and in short GG) is often employed, 
where the recipient is given an endowment and the dictator decides how much to ‘take’ 
from the recipient’s endowment. The aim of this framing is to investigate greed and to test 
whether ‘not taking’ is equivalent to ‘giving’. Suvoy (2003), who was the first to introduce 
the ‘taking’ frame in the social preference literature,1 did not find any significant difference 
in the allocations between the two frames, a conclusion both shared and contested in 
subsequent studies, which we discuss later.  
The literature, however, has not investigated whether the implementation of the 
giving and taking frames would give rise to any gender effects. The current study is aimed 
at this particular question. We run a between-subject dictator game with two alternative 
framing, ‘give’ (GG) and ‘take’ (TG), involving a balanced pool of male and female 
dictators while holding the total amount to be divided constant.  
We expect the gender issue to be potentially important for the following reasons. 
Various studies in economics and psychology alike suggest that a change in framing may 
cause diverse and gender specific cognitive biases, and in turn different behaviors (Croson 
and Gneezy, 2009). These include endowment effects (Thaler, 1980) or status-quo bias 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).  It has also been evidenced that males and females 
differ in their perception of the entitlement effects and property rights (Bylsma and Major, 
                                                          
1 Eichenberger and Oberholzer–Gee (1998) and Falk and Fischbacher (2002) have earlier introduced this 
game in the context of crime. 
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1992), or endowment effects (Dommer and Swaminathan, 2013). In standard dictator 
giving games Eckel and Grossman (1998) found different behaviors between male and 
female dictators.   
Based on the above evidence, it is reasonable to expect that the introduction of two 
alternative framings, as we have done in this paper, would permit us to study asymmetric 
gender effects, if any. Specifically, the giving frame introduces a salience of the dictator’s 
property right (over the fund), while the taking frame does the same for the recipient’s 
property right. Since males and females tend to have different perceptions of property right, 
we should see asymmetric behaviors across the two genders under two different framings.  
Indeed, our results support this hypothesis. We find that: (i) Males are less generous 
in taking games than in giving games. (ii) Females are more generous in taking games than 
in giving games. (iii) In taking games, females are more generous than males. (iv) In giving 
games, females’ generosity is not significantly different from the males’ generosity. (v) 
Females are more likely to be egalitarian under taking frames than under giving games. (vi) 
Males are more likely to be selfish under the taking frame than under the giving frame. 
We infer that the results obtained are due to males’ (relatively) stronger sense of 
entitlement and property right as shown by Bylsma and Major (1992) and females’ 
(relatively) stronger endowment effect as shown by Dommer and Swaminathan (2013). On 
one hand, the taking frame may trigger differing degrees of entitlement effect between 
males and females, resulting in divergent behaviors. On the other hand, the giving frame 
may trigger an endowment effect. Although the (hypothesized) endowment effect is not 
discernably different between males and females, it is probably weaker than the entitlement 
effect for males and stronger than the entitlement effect for females – as discussed in the 
literature, so that the two genders end up behaving in opposite ways under the two framings.  
Our study contributes to two related streams of literature. First, it contributes to the 
investigations of the effects of gender in the dictator game. Second, it also relates to the 
literature investigating the effects of framing in dictator games. Below we specify our 
contribution in both the streams.  
Bolton and Katok (1995) are the first to test the effect of dictator gender on dictator 
giving in the GG and find no such effect. Eckel and Grossman (1998), however, find that 
women are more generous than their male counterparts in a GG when the recipient is a 
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charity. Further studies such as Selten and Ockenfels (1998), Dickinson and Tiefenthaler 
(2002), Cadsby et al. (2010) contribute to this mixed result. There is no existing study 
investigating the same for a pure Taking Game. There are studies that allow cues and the 
effects of being observed, or reveal gender identities – issues that we do not consider. Alevy 
et al. (2014) consider the effects when the dictator decisions are being observed and find 
that males take less and females remain unaffected in allocation decisions while being 
observed. In a study along the same lines, Chowdhury et al. (2014) find males take less and 
females take more in presence of social cues in a TG. Kettner and Ceccato (2014) 
investigate the effects of framing while interacting with revelation of dictator and recipient 
gender. They find that dictators take significantly less when the recipient is of the opposite 
gender. Our study shows that independent of cues and identities, the interaction of framing 
and gender itself can be significant effects. 
 Our study also shades light on the question of equivalence between ‘giving’ and 
‘not taking’ by comparing the recipient’s payoff under two alternative framings. Since 
Suvoy’s (2003) claim of equivalence the issue has been investigated time and again by 
changing the type of recipient, using laboratory or online experiment, and by varying the 
decision space (i.e., by giving the dictator an option to ‘give’ or ‘take’). Among them, 
Dreber et al. (2013) Kettner and Ceccato (2014) and  Grossman and Eckel (2015) find 
equivalence between giving and not taking.2 We support and extend their results. We also 
show that although the overall equivalence prevails in terms of overall payoff, the framing 
effect is opposite when we consider dictator’s gender. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, 
Section 3 reports the results, and Section 4 concludes with further discussions. 
 
 
                                                          
2 In our design and in the design of the studies mentioned the decision space is fixed, i.e., the dictators play 
either a GG or a TG, and do not have the option to give and take simultaneously. Furthermore, in our 
experiment the price of giving or taking is fixed. Combining these two features, the total payoff in these two 
games (GG and TG) remains the same. However, there are studies following List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) 
in which the decision space has been set different among frames, or the price of action is different – and as a 
result the total payoff is also different. In such cases Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), Cappelen et al. (2013), 
Korenok et al. (2013, 2014, 2015), and Cox et al. (2016) find that the payoff to the recipient may be different 
with a change in framing.  
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2. Experimental Design 
We employed a between-subject Dictator game with 280 subjects spread over 2 
treatments. Each treatment had 70 dictators and 70 recipients. To ensure gender balance, 
in each treatment we recruited 35 male and 35 female dictators. Only one treatment was 
run in a particular session. In each session, subjects were randomly and anonymously 
placed into pairs and were asked to sit in cubicles. They were then assigned the role as 
either a dictator or a recipient (however, we did not use those terms). Each subject played 
only one role and the roles remained the same until the end of the session.  
All subjects were told that they would receive a £3 show-up fee. In the ‘giving’ 
treatment the dictator was given access to an additional £10 fund and could transfer any 
amount between £0 and £10 (in denominations of 1 penny) to the recipient. In the ‘taking’ 
treatment the recipient was given access to an additional £10 and the dictator could transfer 
any amount between £0 and £10 (in denominations of 1 penny) to himself/herself. We 
executed neutral word such as ‘transfer’ instead of ‘give’ and ‘take’, and ‘access’ instead 
of ‘belong’ to minimize any experimenter demand effect (Zizzo, 2010) arising from the 
instruction (which are available in the Appendix). The role of the recipients was passive, 
meaning that they had to accept the dictators’ decision.  
Each session consisted of two parts. In the first part, the dictators made decisions. 
In the second part, the recipients had to guess the amount the dictator had given or taken. 
If the absolute difference between the actual amount and the guess was within 50 pence, 
then the recipient received an extra £1.3 As we did not find any treatment or gender effect 
in the guesses, this element is not discussed further. 
Subjects were students at the University of East Anglia, with no prior experience 
of participating in a GG or a TG experiment, recruited randomly through the online 
recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The sessions were computerized with z-TREE 
(Fischbacher, 2007). A subject could participate in only one session. Each session took 
around 30 minutes and the average payment was £8.  
                                                          
3 This incentive mechanism for guess is similar to the one by Chowdhury and Jeon (2013). The instructions 
for the second part was given only after the first part was finished. It was also mentioned in the instruction 
of the first part that the recipient’s decision was payoff irrelevant to the dictator, restricting any strategic 
interaction between dictator decision and recipient anticipation. 
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3. Results 
Table 1 shows the average amount allocated (amount given in the GG, or (£10 – 
amount taken) in the TG) for both aggregated data and also for male and female by 
treatment. In the GG, an average of £2.066 is given to the recipients. In the TG, the dictators 
take on average £7.87 and as a result, the amount left to the recipient is £2.13. A Mann-
Whitney test shows no significant difference in final amount allocated to recipients 
between the two treatments (p-value = 0.583). This result is consistent with the established 
result (Dreber et al., 2013; Grossman and Eckel, 2015) that there is no effect of framing in 
dictator allocation. We now investigate these actions across gender. Male dictators on 
average allocate £2.117 in the GG and £0.997 in the TG towards the recipients, and a 
Mann-Whitney test shows significant difference at 1% level. However, the average 
allocation by female dictators is £2.014 in the GG and £3.263 in the TG, and the difference 
is significant at 5% level. The results also confirm within treatment gender differences. In 
the GG, the amount given by male and female are not different (p-value = 0.594). The TG, 
however, shows gender differences. The average amount left by the male dictators is 
significantly lower than the amount left by the female dictators at 1% level. 
 
Table 1. Average (Standard Dev) allocation to recipient  
Data Giving game Taking game 
Mann-Whitney test 
(Giving vs. Taking) 
All 
(70 obs. / treatment)  
2.066 
(1.734) 
2.130 
(2.394) 
No difference 
(p=0.583) 
Male 
(35 obs. / treatment)  
2.117 
(1.530) 
0.997 
(1.589) 
Different at 1% 
 (p = 0.001) 
Female 
(35 obs. / treatment) 
2.014 
(1.938) 
3.263 
(2.543) 
Different at 5% 
( p = 0.039) 
Mann-Whitney test 
(Male vs. Female) 
No difference 
(p=0.594) 
Different at 1% 
(p= 0.0001) 
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To control for interactions and to test robustness of the results above we further run 
a series of OLS regressions as reported in Table 2. The dependent variable is the amount 
allocated to the recipient and the independent variables are treatment dummy, gender 
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dummy, their interactions and an age dummy (Age21=1 if age ≤ 21).4 We run the analysis 
for the whole data and separately for males and females. 
Table 2. Regression of amount allocated to the recipient 
OLS Total Total Male Female 
Intercept 0.720 0.242 0.164 2.588** 
 (0.738) (0.721) (0.765) (1.150) 
Giving game -0.004  1.159*** -1.186** 
 (0.345)  (0.373) (0.552) 
Female 1.097***    
 (0.342)    
TG × Female  2.262***   
  (0.464)   
GG × Male  1.155**   
  (0.465)   
GG × Female  1.084**   
  (0.467)   
Age21 0.037 0.033 0.036 0.029 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.047) 
# of Obs. 140 140 70 70 
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.133 0.109 0.051 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**  and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
In the first column of Table 2 we use a dummy for the GG to test for the framing 
effect while controlling for gender and age. Complying with the result in Table 1, the 
coefficient for GG is insignificant, but the coefficient of Female is positive and significant 
at 1% level. The first observation implies no overall treatment effect and mirrors the 
findings of Dreber et al. (2013, Table 1), who report a similar result from their lab 
experiment. The second observation shows that female dictators are more generous than 
males.  
These observations, still, do not reveal any effect of framing on gender. The 
existing literature also does not focus on this issue. Therefore, in order to examine the 
gender effect further, in Colum 2 of Table 2 we introduce interactions of gender and 
                                                          
4 We include age as a control variable for two reasons. First, Engel (2011) shows in his meta-analysis that 
the effect of age is significant in dictator games. Second, a line of research (Grusec, 1972; Bahry and Wilson, 
2006; Sutter and Kocher, 2007) shows effects of age in various social preference experiments. 
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treatment. The coefficient for the interaction of TG and Female and the corresponding post-
regression tests show that females allocate significantly higher amounts in the TG frame 
compared to their male counterparts. Then we run the same regression, without the 
interaction terms, for males and females separately and discover a gender-wise treatment 
effect. In particular, males allocate more amount in the GG compared to the TG (at 1% 
level), but females do exactly the opposite (at 5% level). 
Until now we have analyzed the average amount allocated, and found asymmetric 
effects of framing on gender. But this analysis does reveal the mechanism through which 
this asymmetry arises. Understanding the mechanism, however, is important since it is 
related to the distribution of the ‘social type’ of the dictators. A social type in a dictator 
game is a broad categorization of the subjects given their allocation behavior (see, e.g., 
Fehr et al., 2008). This categorization will help us to understand whether a specific type of 
allocation behavior is observed across treatments or across gender. We define a dictator to 
be ‘selfish’ if he/she does not allocate any money to the recipient, ‘egalitarian’ if he/she 
divides the pie equally, and ‘in-between’ if he/she allocates an amount between zero and 
half-of-the-pie to the recipient. 
 To visualize the allocation distribution in these two frames, we plot the proportion 
of dictators by the amount allocated to the recipients (in approximated blocks) in Figure 1. 
Note that the allocation in both frames exhibits a bimodal distribution of the social types; 
but the second mode as well as the frequency distribution at the modes vary between the 
two frames. In the TG, two modes appear at the ‘selfish’ and ‘egalitarian’ types, while in 
the GG, they appear at the ‘selfish’ and ‘in-between’ types.  The difference in the 
distribution suggests that the two frames invoke different social types. Moreover, the TG 
increases the frequency of both extreme types, selfish as well as egalitarian, by about 10 
percentage points over the GG.   
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Figure 1. Allocation in GG and TG. 
 
We plot the allocation distribution in these two frames by gender in Figure 2. The 
allocation distribution for the GG does not show a specific pattern for either gender; if 
anything it shows a weak form of bimodal distribution. But for the TG the distribution 
drastically changes to a right-skewed one for males and a left-skewed one for females. 
Under the taking frame 60% of the males turn ‘selfish’ and 40% of the females turn 
‘egalitarian’.  Most striking is the way the proportion of the selfish type changed for each 
gender with the change in framing. With the taking frame, the proportion of the selfish 
males massively increased from 22% to 60%; but the proportion of the selfish females 
dropped from 38% to 22%.  Clearly, the taking frame is invoking a strong sense of 
selfishness amongst males, but a fairly strong sense of generosity amongst females.  
Figure 2. Allocation in GG and TG by gender 
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 To test the significance of these observations, we run two sets of Probit regressions. 
The dependent variable in the first set is a dummy for whether a subject is selfish, and in 
the second set a dummy for whether a subject is egalitarian, with the independent variables 
being the  treatment dummy and age.5 We first run the regressions for the whole data, and 
then separately for males and females. We discuss only the gender-specific regressions by 
reporting the marginal effects in Table 3. 
Table 3. Probit Regressions investigating dictators’ social type  
 Male Female 
 Y=Selfish Y=Egalitarian Y=Selfish Y=Egalitarian 
Giving game -0.389*** 0.006 0.075 -0.190** 
 (0.110) (0.067) (0.107) (0.109) 
Age21 -0.012 0.003 -0.006 0.005 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.013)  (0.009) 
# of Obs.        70              70 70               70 
Pseudo R2 0.118           0.009  0.011           0.043 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**  and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
The Probit models confirm that broad observations of Figure 2 are indeed correct; 
there  exists a framing effect across gender for the social type distribution. The first two 
regressions show that males tend to be more selfish in the TG compared to the GG, but the 
frame does not affect their likelihood of being egalitarian. In contrast, the last two 
regressions show that females tend to be more egalitarian in the TG compared to the GG, 
but the frame does not affect their likelihood of being selfish.6  
4. Discussion 
We investigate the effects of gender on the framing of dictator game when the total payoff 
remains the same across treatments. We employ a giving and a taking frame and compare 
                                                          
5 A male subject, who gave £0.09 in the GG, is categorized as a selfish and a Female subject, who took £4.90 
in the TG, is categorized as an egalitarian. Two female subjects, who took £2.10 and £0.00 in the TG, are not 
included in any categories.   
6 The frames do not show a significant effect in the whole data (and hence we do not report the regressions), 
further supporting the overall results of the existing studies. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, corresponding to 
the data of Figure 1 and Figure 2, show no framing effect in allocation for the whole data (p-value = 0.288); 
but significant effects separately for males and for females (p-values of 0.001 and 0.039, respectively). 
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the amount given in the giving frame with the amount left for the recipient in the taking 
frame. We expected a gender effect due to possible endowment effect or the effect of 
perceived entitlement and hence employed a balanced pool of male and female dictators. 
Both non-parametric tests and regressions reaffirm the observations from existing 
studies (Dreber et al., 2013; Grossman and Eckel, 2015) that overall there is no framing 
effect within the dictator game and giving is indeed equivalent to not taking. However, 
further investigations by gender show that framing has opposing effects for females and 
males. Females take less in a taking game compared to what they give in a giving game; 
but the males do just the opposite. Furthermore, we find that this occurs since the male 
dictators are significantly more likely to be selfish in the taking frame compared to the 
giving frame. On the other hand, the female dictators are significantly more likely to be 
egalitarian in the taking frame compared to the giving frame. 
Our result is of interest for a number of reasons. First, this result sheds light on a 
very active line of research regarding the gender effect on behavioral decision making. 
Since the frame induces social-type variations in the dictator, in opposite directions, for the 
two genders, the question of the effect of framing in general on gender-specific behavior 
remains a promising line of research. Such studies will also be helpful to understand why 
the males and females behaved differently in our study of the dictator game. 
Second, we contribute to the debate on the equivalence between ‘giving’ and ‘not 
taking’. One existing line of research finds such equivalence when the total payoff is 
constant, whereas other studies find the opposite result when the total payoff is different.  
We add to this debate showing that as long as we consider the whole population we may 
see equivalence. But when we turn our attention to gender-specific subgroups we see non-
equivalence, an observation novel to this literature.   
Finally, as a consequence of our results, one can alternatively use a giving or a 
taking frame in various research questions without changing the decision space – so long 
as the investigation is not focused on gender; or the issue of taking/giving price, or the 
choice of the game (Korenok et al., 2014; 2015) are absent.  
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Appendix: Instructions 
 
 
1. Instruction for Dictator in Taking game  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Welcome to this experiment! In this experiment each of you will be paired with a different person. 
You will not be told who you are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will 
not be told who you are either during or after the experiment. 
Your decisions will be strictly anonymous and cannot be linked to you in any way. 
The experiment has two parts and is conducted as follows: 
 Everyone in this room has already been allocated a show up fee of £3. You have been 
paired with someone else in the room. 
 The other person you are paired with has access to an additional £10. 
 In the first part of the experiment, you will have to make a simple decision. You have to 
decide what portion, if any, of the £10 to transfer to yourself. Your choice can be 
anywhere from £0 to £10, in 1p increments. Your take-home earnings from this 
experiment will be your initial £3 show up fee plus the money you transfer from the 
person you are paired with. The earnings of the person you are paired with will be his/her 
£3 show up fee plus the money left over from the £10 after you transfer to yourself. 
 In the second part of the experiment, the person you are paired with will make a decision, 
but that decision will NOT affect your earnings. 
You will have 1 minute to come to a decision about your choice. Please do not talk to the other 
people in this room until your session is completed. Do not be concerned if other people make 
their decisions before you.  
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Welcome to this experiment! In this experiment each of you will be paired with a different person. 
You will not be told who you are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will 
not be told who you are either during or after the experiment. 
Your decisions will be strictly anonymous and cannot be linked to you in any way. 
The experiment has two parts and is conducted as follows: 
 Everyone in this room has already been allocated a show up fee of £3. You have been 
paired with someone else in the room. 
 You have access to an additional £10. The other person you are paired with does not have 
access to that extra £10. 
 In the first part of the experiment, you will have to make a simple decision. You have to 
decide what portion, if any, of the £10 to transfer to the person you are paired with. Your 
choice can be anywhere from £0 to £10, in 1p increments. Your take-home earnings from 
this experiment will be your initial £3 show up fee plus the money left over from the £10 
after you transfer to the person you are paired with. The earnings of the person you are 
paired with will be the amount you transfer to him/her plus his/her £3 show up fee. 
 In the second part of the experiment, the person you are paired with will make a decision, 
but that decision will NOT affect your earnings. 
You will have 1 minute to come to a decision about your choice. Please do not talk to the other 
people in this room until your session is completed. Do not be concerned if other people make their 
decisions before you.  
 
